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“IF THE PROBLEM PERSISTS, COME BACK TO SEE ME…” AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES AGAINST GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 
 
*** 
SUMMARY:  The law of negligence, as it applies to GPs, is under explored in the literature.  
There has been no substantial research undertaken that has penetrated deeper into claims that 
have actually reached court in order to analyse judicial reasoning pertaining to both breach of 
duty and causation. Given the increased pressures that GPs now face, these are important 
questions to consider.  It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to present the findings 
of an empirical investigation into a number of reported clinical negligence claims brought 
against GPs.  This analysis provides an original contribution to the developing academic 
discussion surrounding the changing nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and how it has 
come to be viewed in the eyes of the law.  It also assesses the extent to which judges have 
become more receptive to protecting patient rights through the law of negligence, engaging in 
the expanding discourse concerning judicial deference to medical decision-making.  It is argued 
that judges should sometimes show a greater propensity to question expert medical testimony 
in support of GPs, because some of the issues GPs typically face are less complex than in other 
clinical negligence cases involving technical areas of medicine, and that causation does not 
appear to be such a key factor in defeating patient claims.  The work also provides useful 
guidance for GPs and their advisers in respect of where liability is most likely to be founded 
and how behaviour can be modified accordingly to reduce the chances of being sued. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unless there is a serious emergency, or out of hours incident, General Practitioners (GPs) are 
usually the first port of call for patients when they begin to experience symptoms of illness.  
The job of a GP, however, is not an easy one.1  Her role in the provision of modern healthcare 
is expanding and now demands difficult judgement calls to be made in respect of allocation of 
scarce resources and, in some instances, the performance of minor surgical procedures.2  Other 
more routine functions performed by GPs include such things as prescribing antibiotics, 
providing general advice and information to patients about how to deal with illnesses and, 
crucially, referring patients to hospital.3 The latter may be required immediately due to a patient 
                                                          
*  
  
1 Beccy Baird, et al., Understanding Pressures in General Practice (King’s Fund 2016). 
 
2 Ruth Robertson et al., Clinical Commissioning: GPs in Charge (King’s Fund 2016); Jonathan Botting et al., 
‘Safety of Community-Based Minor Surgery Performed by GPs: An Audit in Different Settings’ (2016) 66 British 
Journal of General Practice e323. 
 
3 GPs also face a number of mental health and social issues which account for a significant amount of their time. 
These issues fall outside the scope of this paper. 
Anonymous Manuscript                                                                                                           Page 2 of 32 
presenting with symptoms which are consistent with a medical emergency, or, alternatively, a 
referral may be made on a non-urgent basis for further diagnostic procedures or a specialist 
consultation. 
 Claims against GPs do not usually make it as far as court, but occasionally they do and 
it is here where, from a legal perspective, a number of important considerations have to be 
borne in mind.  Faced with a high volume of patients, under considerable resource and time 
constraints, a GP must reach a conclusion very quickly about how best to deal with the list of 
symptoms exhibited.  Thus, where a claim reaches court, a judge must remain cognisant of 
these difficulties when seeking to determine the appropriate legal standard of care, for if the 
threshold for establishing a breach of duty against a GP is set at too low a level, it may 
unreasonably increase her legal exposure.  Equally taxing questions exist in relation to 
causation, because the pathology of certain illnesses may render it incredibly difficult to prove 
that any breach of duty on the part of a GP caused or materially contributed to the harm 
complained of by the patient. 
 The law of negligence, as it applies to GPs, is under explored in the literature.  An 
existing study has investigated the volume and type of claims made against GPs,4 and an 
empirical investigation reflecting legally on the altruistic tendencies of GPs has also been 
published.5  However, there has been no substantial research undertaken that has penetrated 
deeper into claims that have actually reached court in order to analyse judicial reasoning 
pertaining to both breach of duty and causation. Despite only a modest number of claims being 
made against GPs,6 the increased pressures that they now face mean that these are important 
                                                          
4 Aneez Esmail et al., Case Studies in Litigation: Claims Reviews in Four Specialties (Manchester Centre for 
Healthcare Management, University of Manchester 2004). 
 
5 Kevin Williams, ‘Doctors as Good Samaritans: Some Empirical Evidence Concerning Emergency Medical 
Treatment in Britain’ (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 258. 
 
6  A Freedom of Information Request was submitted by the author to the NHSLA on 16/10/2017, requesting data 
on claims made against GPs over the last six years.  The NHSLA’s response, sent on 2/11/2017, provided data on 
all the claims made against GPs over the last six years since its CNST Scheme began in 1995. The data reflected 
the cumulative number of claims made during that time period.  Thus, in 2012, the total number of claims made 
against GPs since 1995 was 363. In 2013, the figure was 446. In 2014, the figure was 524.  In 2015, the figure 
was 550. In 2016, the figure was 672.  Thus, as of 31/3/17, the total number of claims made against GPs since 
1995 is 727.  The most significant increase in claims was between 2015 and 2016.  It is difficult to discern from 
the data above why this may have been the case. One possible reason is the changes made to the Clinical 
Negligence Pre-Action Protocol, which came into force in April 2015. Equally, the continued impact of one-way 
costs-shifting, introduced in April 2013 for personal injury (including clinical negligence) claims, may have 
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questions to consider. 7   It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to present the findings 
of an empirical investigation into a number of reported clinical negligence claims brought 
against GPs.  From a theoretical legal perspective, this analysis provides an original 
contribution to the developing academic discussion surrounding the changing nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship, and how it has come to be viewed in the eyes of the law.8 It also 
assesses the extent to which judges have become more receptive to protecting patient rights 
through the law of negligence,9 engaging in the expanding discourse concerning judicial 
deference to medical decision-making.10 Based on the findings, it is argued that judges should 
sometimes show a greater propensity to question expert medical testimony in support of GPs, 
because some of the issues GPs typically face are less complex than in other clinical negligence 
cases involving technical areas of medicine, and that causation does not appear to be such a 
key factor in defeating patient claims.  The work also has practical significance, providing 
useful guidance for GPs and their advisers in respect of where liability is most likely to be 
founded and how behaviour can be modified accordingly to reduce the chances of being sued. 
 The article begins by setting out the legal framework underpinning the study.  The 
narrative then outlines the methodology employed, and explains the method of data analysis.  
Thereafter, the work proceeds to discuss the substantive research findings, and concludes by 
offering some tentative observations about how they may inform future clinical practice. 
 
II. SETTING THE SCENE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
i) Breach of Duty 
As a result of the Bolam test, claimants traditionally faced great difficulty when attempting to 
pursue a negligence claim against a GP.11  The test stated that, provided a medical practitioner 
                                                          
7 Baird et al., n 1. 
 
8 Rob Heywood and José Miola, ‘The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient at 
the Heart of the Matter’ (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 296; Harvey Teff, Reasonable Care: Legal 
Perspectives on the Doctor Patient Relationship (OUP 1996). 
 
9 Charles Foster, ‘Autonomy in the Medico-Legal Courtroom: A Principle Fit for Purpose?’ (2014) 22 Medical 
Law Review 48; Brooke LJ, ‘Patients, Doctors and the Law (1963-2003): A Few Reflections’72 Medico-Legal 
Journal 17. 
 
10 Sarah Devaney and Søren Holm, ‘The Transmutation of Deference in Medicine: An Ethico-Legal Perspective’ 
(2018) Medical Law Review doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fwy013; Raymond Tallis, Hippocratic Oaths: 
Medicine and its Discontents (Atlantic 2004); RH Woolf, ‘Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical 
Profession?’ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 1. 
 
11 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.  See JL Montrose, ‘Is Negligence an 
Ethical or Sociological Concept?’ (1958) 21 Modern Law Review 259  
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acted in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion, she was not liable in 
negligence.12  It mattered not that there was a body of opinion that existed which would have 
acted to the contrary.13  Under conventional Bolam, judges were prevented from preferring one 
body of medical opinion to another, 14 the consequence of which was that they were prohibited 
from executing their usual function in professional negligence cases, which is to objectively 
scrutinise competing bodies of expert testimony in order to ascertain what is reasonable.15  
Amidst the range of options and uncertainties faced by a GP when deciding how best to treat a 
patient, it would nearly always be possible for her to adduce a body of expert opinion to support 
her adopted course of action.  Given that there was effectively no scope for a judge to scrutinise, 
or indeed question, the rationale and thought process underpinning that evidence, it was rare 
for a judge to ever hold that the body of opinion supporting a defendant was, in fact, 
unreasonable.16  However, subtle legal developments then began to take shape.  In Hucks v 
Cole, an early GP case, it was suggested by Sachs LJ in the Court of Appeal that ‘when the 
evidence shows that a lacuna in professional practice exists by which risks of grave danger are 
knowingly taken, then, however small those risks, the courts must anxiously examine that 
lacuna – particularly if the risks can be easily and inexpensively avoided.’17  This delivered a 
clear message that in some instances it was appropriate for judges to question the basis of 
medical decision-making and, where necessary, to condemn as negligent any course of action 
that exposed a patient to an unreasonable risk. 
 Building on Hucks, the decision of the then House of Lords in Bolitho is sometimes 
said to be the case that finally redressed many of the difficulties created by Bolam.18 In his 
judgment, Lord Browne-Wilkinson confirmed that judges did retain the power to exercise 
                                                          




14 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634. 
 
15 Harvey Teff, ‘The Standard of Care in Clinical Negligence – Moving on from Bolam’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 473 at 481. 
 
16 Michael Jones, ‘The Bolam Test and the Reasonable Expert’ (1999) 7 Tort Law Review 226. 
 
17 Hucks v Cole (1968) [1993] 4 Med LR 393 at 397.  It should be noted that this case was actually decided in 
1968, and only reported later in 1993. 
 
18 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.  See Andrew Grubb, ‘Negligence: Causation and 
Bolam’ (1998) 6 Medical Law Review 378. It should be noted that Lord Browne-Wilkinson restricted his reasoning 
only to matters of diagnosis and treatment.  Disclosure of risks fell outside the scope of the judgment. 
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independent objective scrutiny of expert medical testimony in clinical negligence cases.19  
Significantly, in the wake of Bolitho, any purported responsible body of medical opinion could 
only be held to be such if it was capable of withstanding the logical scrutiny of a judge.  In 
determining the logicality of any expert opinion, judges were directed to give their minds to 
the relative risk versus benefit ratio of the course of action advocated.20  In the context of claims 
against GPs, after Bolitho there ought to be greater scope for a judge to question any expert 
testimony lending support to a defendant’s case,21 yet whether or not these risk versus benefit 
calculations are carried out in the way that they should be remains a moot point.22  An important 
question that this study therefore seeks to explore is the impact of Bolitho on cases against 
GPs.23  Is there a willingness from judges to scrutinise expert testimony in a way that operates 
to the benefit of claimants, or is there still a tendency to classify a body of medical opinion in 
support of a GP as being responsible, merely because one such opinion exists?  
 In addition to Bolitho, the law of clinical negligence has recently undergone a change 
in mind-set.  The decision of the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire has arguably 
redefined the doctor-patient relationship in the eyes of the law.24  In regard to a doctor’s duty 
of disclosure, Lords Kerr and Reed held that a doctor is under a duty to take reasonable care to 
ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, 
and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality was defined as 
whether, in the circumstances of a case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be 
likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it. This was subject to what is known 
as the therapeutic privilege, which entitles a doctor to withhold information from a patient if 
she reasonably considers that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s 
                                                          
19 Margaret Brazier and José Miola, ‘Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Medical Law Review 
85; John Keown, ‘Reining in the Bolam Test’ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 248. 
 
20 Bolitho, n 18.  Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at p. 243. 
 
21 Grubb, n 18. 
 
22 Rob Heywood, ‘Litigating Labour: Condoning Unreasonable Risk Taking in Childbirth?’ (2015) 44 Common 
Law World Review 28; Rachael Mulheron, ‘Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s “Gloss”’ 
(2010) 69 Cambridge Law Journal 609; Rob Heywood, ‘The Logic of Bolitho’ (2006) 22 Journal of Professional 
Negligence 225. 
 
23 See Marriott v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1999] Lloyd's Rep Med 23. 
 
24 [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] AC 1430. 
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health.25  While the case concerned risk disclosure, the judgment itself transcends that single 
issue and is symbolic because of the way in which it elevates the position of patient rights 
within the law of negligence.  The notion of patient empowerment through the exercise of self-
determination occupied centre stage in the reasoning of their Lordships, and they distanced 
themselves from any historical judicial attitudes which were accepting of unqualified deference 
to the medical profession.26 The direction of travel of medico-legal jurisprudence is now 
patient-facing as opposed to doctor-led which, ultimately, may lead to a subtle change in 
emphasis in the reasoning of judges in the lower courts.27 
 It is anticipated that the impact of Montgomery in respect of claims against GPs will be 
minimal. First, it is still too early to assess with any accuracy the true effect that the judgment 
will have on claims of this type; it is only after a body of case law has built up over time that it 
will become possible to undertake any rigorous analysis. Secondly, the majority of claims made 
against GPs will not involve allegations of negligent disclosure and so the case is not squarely 
on point. Nevertheless, the importance of Montgomery should not be underestimated.28  In the 
aftermath of the judgment it is possible that judges may be more inclined to approach cases 
with a sympathetic eye towards patients, especially in the light of the recognised asymmetry of 
position between the two parties.29  Quite apart from that though there are occasions in primary 
care where information disclosure may become more of a substantive legal issue in its own 
right. Where, for example, GPs perform minor operations, in the future Montgomery may well 
be relevant in terms of the consent processes which are undertaken before those minor 
procedures are performed.  Thus, post-Montgomery, it will be interesting to assess whether 
there is any evidence of a general change in attitude from judges which appears to be more 




                                                          
25 Ibid at [87]–[88].  See Emma Cave, ‘The Ill-Informed: Consent to Medical Treatment and the Therapeutic 
Exception’ (2017) 46 Common Law World Review 140. 
 
26 Ibid, per Lords Kerr and Reed at [75], and [81] – [83]. 
 
27 Heywood and Miola, n 8. 
 
28 Judy M Laing, ‘Delivering Informed Consent post-Montgomery: Implications for Medical Practice and 
Professionalism’ (2017) 33 Journal of Professional Negligence 128, at pp. 142 – 152. 
 
29 Tallis, n 10. 
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ii) Causation  
Running parallel to the legal issues concerning breach, there are also pertinent questions 
relating to causation.  The situations in which it ought to be incumbent upon a GP to refer a 
patient to hospital immediately will often involve aggressive, rapid-progression illnesses.  One 
problem with illnesses of this kind is being able to prove that, had a referral been made, things 
would have turned out differently for the patient. It may well be impossible to prove that had 
an earlier hospital referral been made, any subsequent damage would have been avoided 
because, no matter what the hospital would have done, the long-term harm caused by the 
destructive illness would already have occurred.30   
 Further problems are also encountered whereby the conduct of both a hospital and a GP 
is called into question.  Where, upon receiving a patient, a hospital is also alleged to have been 
negligent in its diagnosis and treatment, it may become difficult to pinpoint whose negligence 
was the main contributing cause of any damage to the patient. Was the late, or lack of, referral 
by a GP a sufficient causal factor to the underlying harm, or, irrespective of that negligence, 
did the patient still arrive at hospital at a point at which non-negligent care would have rendered 
the harm avoidable? If the negligence of the hospital failed to prevent harm at a stage where it 
could still have been avoided, it provides a GP with an opportunity to argue that the 
responsibility should shift onto the hospital.31  Since the Court of Appeal decision in Wright (A 
Child) v Cambridge Medical Group (A Partnership), this particular avenue ought to have been 
closed off.32  Where both a GP was negligent in providing a late referral, and the hospital was 
also then negligent in its treatment, it was held that the hospital’s treatment of the patient was 
not such an egregious event, in terms of the degree of unusualness of the negligence, or the 
period of time for which it lasted, to defeat or destroy the causative link between the GP’s 
negligence and the patient’s injury.33 Moreover, a causal link existed between the late referral 
and the eventual harm suffered as it deprived the patient of the opportunity to receive prompt 
and appropriate medical care in hospital, which would have meant there was more time to treat 
                                                          
30 Kay's Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board [1987] 2 All ER 417. 
 
31 Maguire v Northwest Strategic Health Authority [2012] EWHC 3272 at [18] – [19].  Similar arguments have 
also been made in respect of pharmacists, who also should have noticed errors on the part of a GP. See Dwyer v 
Roderick (1983) 127 SJ 806; Prendergast v Sam and Dee Ltd [1990] 1 Med LR 36. 
 
32 [2011] EWCA Civ 669; [2013] QB 312. 
 
33 Ibid at [37]. 
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the patient effectively.34  The extent to which this ruling has since been relied upon by both 
claimants and defendants in GP cases is thus fertile ground for exploration.35 
 GPs will also encounter progressive illnesses which evolve at varying rates, often 
concealing the deleterious effect they may be having on the patient until it is too late.36  In a 
situation where a GP negligently fails to spot a potential symptom of cancer and as a result the 
patient then receives a late diagnosis, the patient will be likely to argue that, had an appropriate 
diagnosis and subsequent referral been made at the correct time, they would have stood a much 
better chance of survival.  In Gregg v Scott, a delayed cancer diagnosis reduced the claimant’s 
chance of a cure from 42% to 25%.37  He had thus lost a 17% chance of a cure. 38 The majority 
of their Lordships in the House of Lords found against the claimant on the basis that he could 
not prove that had there been no breach of duty on the part of his GP, he would have had a 
better than 50% chance of a cure.39  While it has since been suggested by the Court of Appeal 
that recovery in loss of chance claims should not be considered completely foreclosed in 
clinical negligence actions, it was said to be an extension to the law which could only be made 
by the Supreme Court.40  At present recovery for a loss of a chance in clinical negligence is not 
permissible and if this line of argument is pursued frequently in claims against GPs, claimants 
will fail to recover damages. 
 
III. THE STUDY 
i) Context 
Clinical negligence claims made against GPs, for a variety of reasons, are not as high as the 
number of claims made against healthcare professionals in secondary care.41  As Brazier and 
                                                          
34 Ibid at [61]. 
 
35 Nicholas J McBride and Sandy Steel, ‘Suing For The Loss of a Right to Sue: Why Wright is Wrong’ (2012) 28 
Journal of Professional Negligence 27; Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, ‘Causation and the Medical Duty to Refer’ 
(2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 208. 
 
36 Baxter and Others v McCann [2010] EWHC 1330; [2010] Med LR 473; A v Enskat [2003] EWHC 1630. 
 
37 [2005] UKHL 2; [2005] 2 AC 176 at [5].  See Emmanuel Voyiakis, ‘The Great Illusion: Tort Law and Exposure 




39 Lords Nicholls and Hope dissented. 
 
40 Wright, n 32 at [84]. 
 
41 National Health Service Litigation Authority, Factsheet 3 (August 2017).  Since 1995, the total number of 
claims made against GPs currently stands at 727.  By comparison, in the same time period, the number of surgical 
claims stands at 50, 432, and the number of obstetrics and gynaecology claims stands at 23,415. 
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Cave accurately assert: ‘many common complaints about general practice do not tend to be the 
kind of grievances that make litigation with its expense, pomp and ceremony worthwhile’.42  
The Medical Defence Union (MDU) has previously identified that common complaints against 
GPs include such things as poor communication or attitude, rudeness, substandard out of hours 
care, difficulty in procuring a home visit or where a patient feels they have been unfairly 
removed from a GP’s list.43  Conduct of this nature, while irritating for those affected by it, 
will rarely cause harm of the magnitude that warrants full-scale litigation, although it may still 
have other professional ramifications.44  Other types of complaint identified by the MDU were 
less prevalent and included allegations of breach confidentiality and inadequate consent.45  
What has been established though is that a GP’s legal exposure is at its highest in relation to 
inappropriate prescribing,46 and, more frequently, in respect of misdiagnosis and/or lack of 
appropriate referral.47  Even so, the chances of these allegations being pursued as far as court 
are still incredibly remote and, with this in mind, over the course of history GPs ought not to 
have been overly concerned about becoming the subject of a lawsuit; nowadays they should 
worry more about sanctions that could be imposed by the GMC.48 Nonetheless, increased 
pressures on general practice, alongside an evolving legal landscape, bring the relevance of this 
study more sharply into focus.49 
 Existing research has highlighted that the quality of care provided by GPs is 
inconsistent, varying significantly across different geographical regions and from practice to 
practice.50  It is perhaps unsurprising then that in recent times legal claims against GPs have 
                                                          
42 Margaret Brazier and Emma Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (6th edn, Manchester University Press 2016) 
at 220. 
 
43 Denis Campbell and Sarah Boseley, ‘GP Negligence Claims: Alarming Rise Revealed’ The Guardian (London, 
29 July 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/29/gps-missing-serious-illnesses> accessed 2 
October 2017. 
 
44  See https://www.gmc-uk.org/concerns/hearings_and_decisions/an_introduction_to_adjudication.asp.  
 
45 Campbell and Boseley, n 43. 
 
46 Dwyer and Prendergast, n 31. 
 
47 Nick Goodwin et al., Improving the Quality of Care in General Practice (King’s Fund 2011) at p. 46. See also 
Campbell and Boseley, n 43; and Esmail et al., n 4. 
 
48 See n 44. 
 
49 Heywood and Miola, n 8. 
 
50 Goodwin et al., n 47; Baird et al., n 1.   
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become more common,51 which ought to be a concern not only for GPs, but also for medical 
defence organisations.52  Set against these considerations, Brazier and Cave’s assertion that 
‘changes in general practice which alter the more personal relationship between GP and patient 
may increase the GP’s vulnerability to claims for clinical negligence’, is one possible 
explanation as to why claims have become more frequent.53  However, important questions 
remain which are in need of further exploration.  Previous studies identifying which of a GP’s 
activities are most likely to become the subject of litigation are limited in scope.54 It is equally, 
if not more, important to investigate how judges reason cases heard in court and to pinpoint 
where liability is most likely to be founded.  This type of investigation provides a greater 
opportunity to generate guidance that can be relied upon not only to inform and improve future 
clinical practice, but also to help GPs avoid the threat of legal action. 
 
ii) Methodology 
A search of Westlaw was performed to provide the data set for this study.  The search was 
confined to those cases which were reported between the dates of 13th November 1997 and 13th 
November 2017.  The justification for limiting the search in this way was that the 13th 
November 1997 was the date on which the then House of Lords handed down its landmark 
judgment in Bolitho.55  After that case, judges were allowed to scrutinise expert medical 
testimony to a greater extent, instead of demonstrating excessive deference to defendant 
testimony, as was the case under Bolam.56   
 The initial search term used in Westlaw was ‘general practitioners’, which was a 
specific term available in a key word search.  The additional search term ‘negligence’ was then 
introduced within those primary results.  Filtering the results in this way narrowed the findings 
and made the data set more accurate and manageable.  In the initial search results which relied 
solely on the term ‘general practitioners’, a significant number of cases unrelated to negligence 
                                                          
51 See n 6. 
 
52 Campbell and Boseley, n 43.  Medical defence organisations, such as the Medical Defence Union and the 
Medical Protection Society, provide indemnity for GP members against clinical negligence claims. They are not, 
however, insurers. 
 
53 Brazier and Cave, n 42 at 219. 
  
54 Esmail et al., n 4. 
 
55 Bolitho, n 18. 
 
56 Bolam, n 11. 
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were returned and concerned such things as employment disputes and fitness to practice 
proceedings.  Thus, ‘negligence’ was chosen because it was the most appropriate secondary 
term to pare down the original results, while at the same time remaining sufficiently broad so 
as to encompass all the cases in which breach of duty and causation were live issues.  Despite 
its introduction, there was still a need to sift out more irrelevant cases.  At this stage, however, 
the data set was smaller and the final honing was performed manually during a thematic 
analysis. 
 The limitations of this approach should be acknowledged.  The search did not account 
for unreported cases against GPs, nor did it capture settled claims or those which were 
abandoned.57  Yet, any attempt to obtain detailed, accurate information about settled and 
abandoned claims would be incredibly difficult and so the value of the data gathered here was 
that it provided a snapshot of the reported cases involving allegations of negligence against 
GPs over a defined twenty-year period.  Given that clear-cut cases usually settle, the majority 
of hits returned represented finely balanced claims in which both sides considered that there 
was a reasonable prospect of success.  The data revealed not only the types of GP conduct 
which commonly gave rise to legal action, but also how those disputes were argued by both 
parties to the litigation and how delicately poised disputes were approached, reasoned and 
determined by judges. 
iii) Analysis 
Between the designated dates of 13th November 1997 until the 13th November 2017, the search 
revealed a total of 56 cases.  A further manual analysis discounted a number of cases on the 
basis that they were not directly relevant.  These included psychiatric injury claims against GPs 
for allegations of abuse, evidential disputes, quantum hearings, fitness to practice cases and 
administrative law issues.  There were also three cases that were duplicated in the findings 
because they began life in the High Court and the proceeded to the Court of Appeal.  These 
cases were counted as one hit, the relevant overall decision on liability being taken from the 
Court of Appeal judgment.  Finally, one further case was removed from the findings on the 
basis that it involved criminal gross negligence manslaughter. 
                                                          
57 Some information on abandoned claims can be found in the Medical Protection Society and Medical Defence 
Union annual reports. See https://www.medicalprotection.org/uk/resources/case-reports.  It should also be noted 
that the coverage of case law across different legal databases does not always match, and the search in this study 
did not take account of cases which may have appeared on either LexisNexis or Bailii.  Prison doctors, who fulfil 
the role of GP for prisoners, were included in the scope of the study. 
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 After discounting the unrelated returns, the data set comprised 35 cases.  These 
judgments were then read and a thematic analysis was conducted with the intention of 
identifying recurring themes from within the transcripts.  Four core themes were identified.  
These were: diagnosis and referral – relevant considerations; balancing of risks versus benefits; 
communication and information exchange; and causation: inimical to success?  These themes 
form the focal point of the discussion below.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
i) Headline Figures 
While this project adopts an interpretivist approach to the data analysis, it is nonetheless useful 
at this stage to highlight some of the headline figures.  In the 35 cases under investigation, 
claimants succeeded in establishing liability against GPs in 45.7% (n=16).  Claimants lost in 
54.3% (n=19) of the cases, meaning that defendant GPs were held not to be liable in just over 
half of the judgments.  82.9% (n=29) of the cases related to allegations of misdiagnoses and 
inappropriate subsequent referral to hospital. Of those 29 cases involving misdiagnosis and 
referral, claimants were successful in 48.3% (n=14) of them, whereas they lost in 51.7% of the 
cases (n=15).  11.4% (n=4) of the cases concerned an allegation of negligent treatment and in 
those cases claimants lost 100% of the time (n=4).  5.7% (n=2) of the judgments related to an 
allegation of negligent communication and advice, in which the claimants had a 100% success 
rate (n=2).  
 Existing research conducted upon a random sample of claims contained in the Medical 
Protection Society and MDU databases found that 50% of those claims were a result of 
diagnostic delay.58  Major themes identified within those claims also centred on lack of 
knowledge and skills, diagnostic difficulties in newborns and children, and an insufficient level 
of suspicion regarding signs and symptoms of rare but life-threatening diseases.59  The figures 
here therefore support some of those previous findings.  That earlier study, however, did not 
provide an in-depth exploration of the judicial reasoning behind those cases and it is here where 
this research provides a more detailed and searching critique of the reasons for, and against, 
liability and whether, on closer examination, they are justified.  The narrative now progresses 
to explore the key themes identified within the analysis. 
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ii) Diagnosis and Referral – Relevant Considerations 
Whether or not the need for a hospital referral is a medical necessity is a difficult judgement 
call for a GP to make.  From a lay perspective, there may be a propensity to answer this question 
in over-simplistic terms.  That is, if there is ever any doubt in a GP’s mind, she ought to be 
obliged to refer the patient to hospital and the law should hold her to account if she fails to do 
so.  Nonetheless, this ‘better safe than sorry’ attitude overlooks the complexities of a referral 
decision.  The difficult nature of the task was underlined by the comments of Maurice Kay LJ 
in Doy v Gunn,60 where he identified that often the form of an illness can be ‘very rare’, but 
that the history of symptoms can be ‘very common’.61  GPs will see a number of patients on 
any given day and, not infrequently, the symptoms complained of by those patients will share 
many similarities. Add to this the fact that very often the early signs and symptoms of certain 
serious illnesses bear close resemblance to those exhibited by more trivial conditions, then the 
challenges encountered by GPs in identifying those rare cases in which common place 
symptoms may be camouflaging a more sinister condition become readily apparent.  It was 
therefore prudent of Holland J in Vance v Taylor not to impose liability on a GP after he 
conducted a home visit and subsequently failed to refer the patient to hospital immediately after 
that assessment.  At the time of the home visit, it would have been almost impossible to 
recognise that the patient was suffering from a virulent infection with ‘features in terms of 
history, presentation and extent that were unusual almost to the point of being unique’.62   
 There is a further aggravating factor.  Time constraints are inimical to a GP’s ability to 
diagnose with complete accuracy and precision.  A typical consultation will last somewhere 
between nine and fifteen minutes, so there are limits to what a GP can be expected to discover 
in that timeframe.63 A standard GP’s surgery will not usually have at its disposal enhanced 
diagnostic imaging machines, nor will it possess the capabilities to perform more invasive 
diagnostic techniques.  It follows that the main way in which a GP will reach the diagnosis 
informing her referral decision is by assessing the presentation of symptoms, questioning the 
patient about the history of those symptoms and undertaking a physical examination. Any 
                                                          
60 [2013] EWCA Civ 547; [2013] Med LR 327. 
 
61 Ibid at [27]. 
 
62 [2007] EWHC 1602; [2007] LS Law Medical 676 at [39]. 
 
63 Baird et al., n 1 at 30; Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), 2006/07 UK General Practice 
Workload Survey (Health & Social Care Information Centre 2007).  Available at: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB01028.  
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physical examination conducted will not be as precise as a specific diagnostic procedure 
performed in hospital and so a conclusion has to be reached on the basis of a swift consultation 
that has an air of generality to it.  In view of these various diagnostic challenges, it is 
understandable that certain conditions may be missed and it would go beyond negligence’s 
core concept of reasonableness for a judge to hold a GP in breach of duty every time something 
went undetected and a referral was not made.   
 Nevertheless, that does not mean that the law should excuse lax conduct where any 
examination is patently substandard.  In Dainton v Powell, Swift J was justified in her 
conclusion that the defendant fell below the standard of care that the law reasonably expects of 
a GP in failing to detect developmental dysplasia of the hip in a child.64  A more conscientious 
investigation should have been conducted which would not have created any extra burden on 
the GP in terms of the time and effort that was needed to complete it.  On the exercise of 
reasonable care, it ought to have been obvious that something untoward was present which 
warranted urgent referral to an orthopaedic specialist.65 
 There are also important questions to consider about the role of experts in GP cases. 
Scholars such as Teff and Jones have previously recognised that one problem with the 
judgment in Bolitho is that it has a tendency to focus a judge’s mind on the internal consistency 
of a particular expert’s testimony.  This detracts from considering the expert opinion in totality, 
set against the broader question of what may or may not have been reasonable in the 
circumstances.66  It is an inescapable consequence of the practicalities of litigation that judges 
will have to place considerable emphasis on the credibility of both factual and expert witnesses, 
but in doing so they should not allow themselves to become too heavily influenced by what 
appears to be the most pre-eminent expert.  If this happens, they may be too quick to accept 
those opinions as being responsible, when objectively viewed that conclusion may appear 
incongruous.  In GP cases, this problem is exacerbated because the defendant and claimant 
experts will often agree on many things, perhaps only disputing one key point that then 
becomes pivotal to determining the question of breach.67  Thus, where both experts agree on 
the uncertainties associated with a particular presentation and identify the ensuing diagnostic 
                                                          
64 [2011] EWHC 219. 
 
65 Ibid at [117]. 
 
66 Teff, n 15; Jones, n 16. 
 
67 See Coakley v Rosie [2014] EWHC 1790 at [60] - [61]. 
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difficulties that flow from it, but then only disagree as to that would have been acceptable 
conduct when faced with that situation, there may be an understandable inclination from judges 
to be more sympathetic to the defendant’s witness. Implicit in this is a recognition that in some 
situations either course of action would have been reasonable and that it was just unfortunate, 
but not negligent, that the conduct of the defendant resulted in harm on the occasion in question.  
It therefore seems evident that judges are prepared to give a certain amount of leeway to GPs 
when it comes to assessing their conduct in respect of diagnosis and referral.  This is a sensible 
attitude, based partly on recognition of the medical and scientific uncertainty associated with 
diagnosis, and partly on an awareness of the practical constraints that GPs have to operate 
within when attempting to reach an accurate determination about how best to treat a patient’s 
condition.68   
 However, this amount of latitude should not be afforded to a GP in every type of referral 
case, nor should judges be completely deterred from deeming defendant expert testimony to be 
irresponsible, where what is being argued for seems unreasonable.  There may be some 
instances where a particular destructive illness is suspected, which could result in devastating 
consequences for the patient.  If, as a result of a missed or delayed diagnosis, those 
consequences transpire, provided that they could have been avoided by a GP taking a simple 
and trouble-free precaution, then the argument for imposing liability where she fails to do so 
gains traction. 
 The thematic analysis exposed a cluster of cases concerning what are best characterised 
as aggressive and rapidly developing illnesses. The pathology of these conditions is slightly 
different to that of slow progression complaints, which may remain asymptomatic until the 
later stages of development. Their aggressive nature often means that time is of the essence, 
because any delay in accurate diagnosis and treatment could result in catastrophic harm.  One 
such condition is meningitis.  27.7% (n=9) of the cases under investigation in this study related 
to meningitis.  Of those 9 cases, claimants lost 55.6% (n=5) of the time and won 44.4% (n=4) 
of the time.  While these findings demonstrate that judges were, on occasion, prepared to hold 
GPs liable, claimants still lost in the majority of cases.  The circumstances in which claimants 
were unsuccessful in meningitis claims turned mainly on evidential disputes as to what actually 
happened in the course of a consultation and to what extent the patient actually exhibited certain 
                                                          
68 Enskat, n 36 at [161] – [162]. 
 
Anonymous Manuscript                                                                                                           Page 16 of 32 
symptoms at the time they were assessed.69  The issue therefore frequently turned on 
credibility, which, as noted earlier, is a crucial aspect of any case and something that judges 
have to play close attention to amidst the throes of litigation.  Trial judges, of course, have the 
benefit of hearing and assessing witnesses first hand, and of observing how they perform under 
cross-examination. Appellate court judges do not enjoy these advantages to the same extent, 
but they do still have access to full expert reports and the daily trial transcripts.  Thus, the law 
reports do not always give a complete picture of the finer points of a case and so a degree of 
caution has to be exercised when attempting to critique judges’ decisions.  Nonetheless, based 
on what is available in the reported transcripts, a number of observations can be made about 
the reasoning of judges in certain GP cases that is suggestive of the fact that the bigger and 
more holistic picture of reasonableness in the circumstances is sometimes missed.70 
 In Knott v Leading the claimant alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to 
refer her to hospital when she had observable symptoms that were consistent with her suffering 
from meningitis.71  During the relevant consultation, the patient, a child, presented with 
symptoms of a sore throat and earache, a temperature and a history of vomiting in the night.  
Moreover, a rash was observed across the upper part of the child’s chest.72  In the opinion of 
the GP this was an urticarial rash and not a meningeal rash; such was his confidence in that 
assessment that he did not apply pressure to the rash to check if it remained or disappeared.73 
As he had witnessed this type of presentation frequently, the GP moved directly to a diagnosis 
of viral illness, even though it was conceded by him that he should not have completely ruled 
out a differential diagnosis.74 Despite its exact classification being the subject of some 
uncertainty, Davies J found that the rash was not meningeal in nature at the time of the 
consultation and held that the GP was not negligent in failing to refer the child to hospital.75   
                                                          
69 FB v Rana [2015] EWHC 1536; W v Johnson [2015] EWHC 276; Doy, n 60; J v Hillard and Others, 24th May 
2001, Unreported. 
 
70 Teff, n 15. 
 
71 [2010] EWHC 1827. 
 
72 Ibid at [34] – [43]. 
 
73 Ibid at [34]. 
 
74 Ibid at [41]. 
 
75 Ibid at [90], and [94] – [95]. 
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 Notwithstanding that the judge may have been more persuaded by the GP’s evidence 
over that of the claimant’s parents as to her actual presentation at the relevant time, here was a 
child that had a collection of symptoms that ought to have raised at least some concern in the 
mind of the GP.  Admittedly, the presence of any one of those symptoms alone may have been 
insufficient to raise the necessary level of alarm, but perhaps those symptoms combined with a 
rash, whatever its true nature, ought to have been enough to persuade the GP to err on the side 
of caution and to refer.  What is required, as stated by Cox J in Large v Waldron, is a ‘careful 
assessment of the totality of the signs and symptoms which exist, even if each symptom 
individually can be regarded as non-specific’.76   
 It was accepted in Knott that the ‘threshold for suspicion’ in meningitis cases was a 
‘low one’ and that, as ‘the consequences of a misdiagnosis can be dire’, a GP has to be confident 
that she can exclude it before deciding not to refer.77 Considering that meningitis is known 
particularly to affect children, and that in some cases those who are very young may not always 
be able to communicate their symptoms other than through the voice of their parents, when 
dealing with a child it is not beyond the realms of reasonableness to expect a higher degree of 
caution from a GP in making her assessment of whether or not to refer.  In line with the expert 
testimony provided in Coakley v Rosie, which suggested that a GP ‘is expected to suspect the 
diagnosis, not to diagnose’,78 judges should perhaps be more inclined to endorse a body of 
medical opinion that supports a suspicious and vigilant attitude.  It follows that where a 
suspicion of meningitis can reasonably be said to exist, or indeed any other such type of 
aggressive condition, given the speed at which they develop, and their potentially severe 
consequences, there should be a greater expectation from judges of the need to refer.  
 Zarb v Odetoyinbo concerned another destructive condition, cauda equina syndrome.  
The GP was held not to be liable for failing to make a same day surgical referral for a patient 
who had previously suffered a disc protrusion. The patient presented to him with pain that 
radiated down both legs, and she was experiencing severe difficulty in walking.79  As with all 
the cases analysed in this study, it is possible that the medical complaint would have been dealt 
with differently when the facts actually occurred.  The incident in Zarb, for example, took place 
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77 Ibid at [43]. 
 
78 Coakley, n 67 at [62]. 
 
79 [2006] EWHC 2880; (2007) 93 BMLR 166. 
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in 2001 and the advice on how best to deal with a suspected case of cauda equina syndrome 
may well have differed back then from the present position. Nowadays, certainly, GPs are 
advised to treat any suspicion of the condition extremely seriously, because time is of the 
utmost importance.80  It is only natural then that one has to be wary of assessing judgments 
with the benefit of hindsight, but even so, certain things can still be said about Zarb given the 
widespread acceptance, even at the time, of cauda equina syndrome being a medical emergency 
with potentially disastrous consequences.81   
 The patient exhibited symptoms that ought to have alerted the GP to the very real danger 
of a serious neurological complaint.  Given that she had previously suffered a disc protrusion, 
which was known to be located in a very delicate position near the spinal cord, the presenting 
symptoms plus that known history should have been enough to trigger a level of suspicion that 
met the threshold for a same day referral.82  Given that cauda equina syndrome can often lead 
to paralysis and permanent loss of bladder and bowel control, the slightest warning signs should 
demand urgent referral, both then and now.  In these aggressive high-risk conditions, it is surely 
open to question Tugendhat J’s declaration that it may well be prudent and sensible for a GP 
to make a same day referral, but that a GP who ‘trusts his own judgment’ and decides not to 
will not act in breach.83  Where simple steps can be taken to avoid a catastrophic degree of 
harm, it should not be beyond the wit of a judge to hold that any course of action that fails to 
take those steps, and any testimony in support of it, is unreasonable in the circumstances and 
therefore negligent. 
 The danger here is that this line of argument could be interpreted to suggest that the 
cautious approach ought to be treated as the ‘gold’ standard in every case and that a GP should 
automatically be held in breach for adopting any other course of action. That is not the 
argument; the point is that a GP, who does not typically participate in intricate and risky 
medical procedures, and who therefore is not in an analogous position to that of many of her 
secondary care colleagues, is sometimes in a position where she can avoid catastrophic harm 
being caused to a patient by taking a straightforward precaution.  Where that precaution is not 
taken, a judge ought to be more willing to make a finding of breach against her. 
                                                          
80 Alan Gardner et al., ‘Cauda Equina Syndrome: A Review of the Current Clinical and Medico-Legal Position 
(2011) 20 European Spine Journal 690. 
 
81 Zarb, n 79 at [15]. 
 
82 Ibid at [3]. 
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iii) Balancing of Risks versus Benefits 
The findings revealed that, in certain situations, judges were actually prepared to depart from 
expert medical testimony led in support of a defendant’s conduct.84  They appeared more 
inclined to do this though where the issue focused on referral, advice and communication, 
evidenced by the fact that claimants never succeeded in treatment cases.  In line with its 
characterisation as a ‘gloss’ on Bolam, Bolitho was only mentioned in passing in the majority 
of cases and a line of reasoning that centred solely on the judgment itself was never really 
invoked.  Nevertheless, there were some cases in which the balancing of risks and benefits did 
feature.85  The Bolitho balancing exercise is a useful arrow in a judge’s quiver because, where 
there is some degree of risk attendant upon a particular course of action, it is useful to offset 
that risk against any potential benefits in order to gauge whether the riskier approach was in 
fact responsible. 
 On the balance point, judges have been seen to hold GPs liable for failing to take basic 
precautions, notwithstanding that there was a body of medical opinion in support of what the 
GP did.86  This is because where a very obvious precaution could have been taken, recourse to 
Bolitho is not necessary as any assessment of the risk versus benefit ratio would be so one sided 
that any ‘balancing’ of the two would be superfluous.  Hence, the argument in Langdon v 
Williams that it was acceptable not to rouse a sleeping baby in order to assess accurately its 
level of responsiveness because ‘it is an instinct if you see a baby asleep to leave it’, was clearly 
unsatisfactory.87  This typifies a situation in which a patient was exposed to an unreasonable 
risk without any discernible benefit, where that risk could easily have been avoided. 
 Where, however, the issue relates to more complex treatment decisions, any balancing 
exercise becomes more challenging for judges to undertake.88  It is in these situations where 
they may be more hesitant to interpose their own views over those held by preeminent experts.  
This is understandable to a degree, but it should not always be used as an excuse for abdicating 
any objective assessment of the evidence in its entirety.  Take, for example, Maguire v North 
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87 [2008] EWHC 741 at Conclusions, [xiv]. 
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West Strategic Health Authority.89  The case is complicated, but in essence involved a GP and 
a hospital effectively blaming each other for failing to detect the recurrence of a leak of cerebro-
spinal fluid from the patient’s nose, which ultimately caused him to suffer brain damage.90  One 
of the key questions that fell to be decided was whether, if the patient had been offered an 
earlier follow-up appointment after his initial discharge from the hospital, the consultant should 
have performed what is known as a ‘tilt test’ in order to identify any recurrence of the leak at 
that earlier stage.91  Despite this component of the case not focusing on the GP’s conduct, it 
neatly illustrates some of the problems faced by judges in the realms of assessing treatment 
decisions. Undoubtedly there would have been some benefits to undertaking a tilt test in that it 
could have exposed the underlying problem earlier, meaning that there would never have been 
any need for the GP to be called into action at a later date, but there were also very clear risks 
attached to that course of action.  If there was immature healing of the fistula from which the 
leak initially occurred, a tilt test could have caused increased hydraulic pressure, which would 
have disrupted the healing process.92  In respect of the risk versus benefit ratio, while the test 
itself may have been simple and non-traumatic insofar as its execution was concerned, the risk 
that could flow from it was potentially extremely severe.  In view of this, it would have been 
very difficult to justifiably classify any medical testimony in support of not performing the test 
as being irresponsible.93 
 In contrast, judges ought not to be too reticent to intervene in relation to every treatment 
issue.  In Thompson v Bradford, the main allegation of negligence centred on the fact that a GP 
failed to recognise that a perianal abscess in a small child was symptomatic of an acute illness 
rather than a localised infection.94  He then reassured the child’s parents that there was no 
reason why an immunisation against Polio should not go ahead, which was subsequently 
                                                          
89 Maguire, n 31. 
 
90 Even though the patient eventually contracted meningitis from the original injury, for the purposes of analysis 
this case was not categorised as a pure meningitis case.  
 
91 Maguire, n 31 at [30].  The tilt test is a relatively simple and non-invasive diagnostic procedure, the aim of 
which is to assess whether or not any fistula has healed, or if there is still evidence of a recurrent leak when the 
patient experiences downward pressure. 
 
92 Ibid at [118]. 
 
93 Indeed, HHJ Cotter QC was satisfied that a responsible body of clinicians would not have undertaken a tilt test, 
at [116]. 
 
94 [2004] EWHC 2424.  For the purposes of analysis this was classified as a treatment case, which the claimant 
lost. A subsequent allegation of negligent disclosure was heard before the Court of Appeal, discussed below. 
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administered.  Shortly afterwards the abscess had to be lanced under general anaesthetic and, 
as a consequence of that operation, the patient was left with an open wound.  The Polio vaccine, 
as a live virus, then infiltrated the wound and tragically the child contracted the very condition 
that the vaccine sought to guard against.95   It was accepted that a recurrent and perianal abscess 
is an unusual presentation in general practice and that it may well have required surgery in the 
future.96  
Arguably, these symptoms alone ought to have prompted a more careful thought pattern 
from the GP as to whether something more sinister was occurring. Irrespective of that, 
whatever the true diagnosis, it is submitted that caution ought to have prevailed.  There were 
clearly benefits to postponing the vaccination to assess the true nature of the illness, which 
would not have exposed the child to any increased risk, save that the vaccination would have 
been slightly delayed.97  The patient was therefore exposed to a disproportionate and 
unreasonable risk; he was subjected to a live virus when the doctor ought to have foreseen the 
possibility of a future open wound, compared to the much more discernible benefit of 
postponement, which ultimately would have avoided the consequences of that severe and 
unnecessary risk.  This is the paradigm example of a situation in which the judge should have 
engaged with the expert opinion to a greater extent, perhaps questioning why the defendant’s 
expert endorsed behaviour which, despite being technically in accordance with Green Book 
Guidelines on common immunisation practice at the time, ignored any consideration of the 
need to proceed with extra diligence in the light of the especial peculiarities of the child’s 
condition.98 Remaining sensitive to a unique condition in a young child, and thereby suggesting 
a delay in the vaccination, surely portrays the expert testimony presented on behalf of the 
claimant in a more respectable and reasonable light.99 
 While it may be more challenging for a judge to weigh the risks and benefits where the 
dispute involves medical questions concerning appropriate treatment, it may not necessarily be 
                                                          
95 Ibid at [18] – [20]. 
 
96 Ibid at [17]. 
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98 The 1996 edition of the “Green Book” was identified by both experts as the definitive work which a reasonably 
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99 The claimant in Thompson eventually lost, which the Court of Appeal later affirmed. See [2005] EWCA Civ 
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as difficult where the focus is on referral. These issues sometimes demand less in the way of 
technical medical expertise and the risk versus benefit ratios are not as finely balanced. Indeed, 
the findings here are indicative of varying attitudes from judges in regard to the balancing of 
risks and benefits in a patient’s favour in referral cases.  Foskett J in Ganz v Childs suggested 
that where there was ‘some’ chance that a child may be suffering from pneumonia, it would be 
imperative to discover that quickly.100  As such, there could be no logical basis for delaying the 
relevant hospital tests. Where a child was concerned, his approach to the balancing exercise 
was that if the tests ‘proved negative, nothing would be lost and pneumonia would have been 
excluded. If the tests were positive, suitable treatment could be put in place quickly.’101  Given 
that children are perhaps more susceptible to certain conditions, and that they may not be able 
to communicate their symptoms as clearly as adults, a low threshold for suspicion is necessary.  
An additional layer of caution was therefore recognised by Foskett J as being essential when 
dealing with children.  Nonetheless, it is not entirely fair of him to suggest that ‘nothing would 
be lost’ in terms of mandating a referral.  This gives the impression that the balancing exercise 
is wholly one-sided, which is a misnomer.    
 Referrals take time, cost money and, in some instances, will expose the patient to 
unnecessary levels of discomfort.  There are also questions concerning allocation of resources. 
This was identified by Leveson LJ in Ministry of Justice v Carter, where he pointed out that 
specialist referrals have ‘implications in relation to the pressure of work on this service’.102  At 
various junctures in the judgment, guidance from professional regulatory bodies was also 
alluded to which actively discouraged the practice of routinely over-investigating or making 
inappropriate referrals.103  Some of those guidelines have since been updated and now focus 
more on when to refer, rather than when not to.104  However, an interesting question is 
nonetheless raised about whether or not there is a hidden agenda behind actively discouraging 
referrals. In Carter, there was no suggestion of a financial reward for the doctor in not referring 
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the patient, yet a more recent article in the Guardian claimed that some GP practices were 
offered financial rewards for not referring patients to hospital,105 which is worrying. 
 It is one thing to encourage a GP to rely on her own clinical judgement and to back her 
own diagnosis after a careful and robust examination of a patient, it is quite another to suggest 
that a culture of referrals should be suppressed because of the additional cost and strain it may 
be placing on the NHS.  Any incentives not to refer, financial or otherwise, must form part of 
a holistic balancing process in the mind of a GP when deciding whether or not to refer, and this 
approach should equally form an integral part of a judge’s reasoning when determining the 
legal question of breach.  The balancing exercise should include not only consideration of the 
presentation of symptoms, but also the severity and consequences of any suspected illness, any 
previous complaints suffered by the patient, the range of alternative diagnoses and any 
characteristics particular to the patient that may increase the risk factor of any suspected 
condition. 106  Resource questions are, of course, relevant factors which should also be 
accounted for in any balancing process and, in some instances, they may even prove to be the 
prevailing consideration.  Yet, concerns over resources should not be allowed to dictate entirely 
the decision-making process in respect of referrals, especially where there are a combination 
of compelling factors which are indicative of the patient’s health being compromised 
unreasonably by any indecision on the part of a GP. 
 
iv) Communication and Information Exchange 
The theme of communication and information exchange permeated throughout many of the 
cases in this study.107  The importance of good communication between doctors and patients 
has been frequently identified.108 A breakdown in communication is often perceived to be a 
key factor that leads to complaints, which in turn may then escalate into formal legal action.109  
                                                          
105 Denis Campbell et al., ‘GP Practices “Offered Rewards” For Not Referring Patients To Hospitals’, The 
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Honing communication skills is therefore seen as a way of reducing complaints and resultant 
legal action.110  The findings illuminate some rather basic errors in communication, which led 
to GPs being held liable.  In Cutting v Islam, for instance, the failure to communicate effectively 
a simple warning to the patient to return to the surgery if his rectal bleeding persisted caused 
the GP to be held liable.111   
 In conjunction with rudimentary communication errors, patient questioning was also a 
prevalent issue.  It would seem that GPs sometimes fall into the trap of communicating in a 
one-dimensional manner. That is, a GP communicates with a view to reaching an accurate 
diagnosis in as short a time as possible, becoming over reliant on standard questions in order 
to rule out certain conditions and to identify others. Given the time pressures, this practice is 
perhaps understandable, but approaching patient questioning in this way injects a degree of 
objectivity to the interaction and it is here where things can sometimes be missed.  It was 
highlighted by Cox J in Large v Waldron that ‘some people are naturally more confident and 
assertive than others and that they will require little prompting in a doctor’s surgery. Others are 
less forthright and require more careful questioning to enable them to articulate and to elaborate 
upon the important information that the doctor requires’.112  It is essential therefore that a GP 
tailors her communication to the wants and needs of the individual patient, for questioning each 
patient in the same way, in terms of both style and substance, may lead to important diagnostic 
information being omitted in any conversation.   
 The need for strong communication skills is enhanced where children are involved; 
very young children may not be able to speak at all, and, even those who may be slightly older, 
may still struggle to convey the true nature of their symptoms.  Accordingly, a GP must glean 
whatever she can from a child, but any gaps must be filled in by the parents.   On this point, a 
worrying message was conveyed by HHJ Cotter QC in Maguire.113 For him a common 
observation in litigation against GPs was ‘the patient’s parents having a real and reasonable 
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concern that there may be a serious problem and being wrongly assured that little was amiss 
after a clearly inadequate assessment by a visiting GP’.114  This is where it becomes especially 
important to view communication as something more than just a one-way conversation. A GP 
must listen as well as question and be encouraged, wherever possible, to initiate a dialogue 
with patients and/or parents.115  She needs to recognise that she only sees a ‘brief snapshot’ of 
what is happening, as opposed to her patient, or her patient’s parents, who get to see ‘the bigger 
picture’.116  A GP should thus adopt an attitude which encourages a more rounded conversation 
between herself and her patient, because taking the time to explore any concerns in greater 
depth may reduce the potential for diagnostic errors and consequential legal action.117 
 Communication must also be viewed as a multifaceted concept.  It is not just about a 
GP conversing with her patient; she must also communicate with her colleagues.  The cases 
unveiled a frequent trend of patients being seen by a number of different GPs on a number of 
different occasions,118 and trouble stemmed from a lack of adequate consideration from one 
GP as to what had occurred previously in a consultation with another colleague.119  There was 
scarce evidence of joined-up thinking and symptoms were often considered in isolation instead 
of any real thought being given to the history behind the current presentation, and to any advice 
and treatment that had been provided at an earlier stage.  Verbal communication, however, 
should not be the sole focus; written communication is of equal importance.   
 In many of the claims against GPs the contemporaneous notes made by the doctor 
played a big part in resolving factual and evidential disputes,120 yet it was sometimes 
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acknowledged that those notes were either incomplete, or perhaps not as detailed as they should 
have been.121  Given that so much will hinge on the quality of the notes should a case against 
a GP ever proceed to court, the advice has to be to make them as thorough and meticulous as 
possible.  The main aim of the notes is to chart a comprehensive history, which can then be 
read by other medical colleagues; they must appear in an accessible and decipherable format 
in order to avoid the problem of a GP not adequately considering what has gone before when 
attempting to reach an accurate diagnosis.  From a legal perspective, the need for 
comprehensive notes is pivotal as having a detailed record of what transpired during the course 
of a consultation may provide a stronger defence for a GP against a lawsuit. It stands to reason 
then that the importance of good practice in note taking should be heavily underlined in primary 
care. 
 In respect of information disclosure, the true impact of the Supreme Court judgment in 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire on GPs remains to be seen.122 It has been suggested that the primary 
care relationship between GPs and patients ‘may not lend itself as easily to the Montgomery 
model of risk disclosure as a GP’s knowledge…may not be as thorough or detailed as one 
would expect of a specialist’.123 GPs may be concerned that they do not have ‘access to the full 
range of information or tools to enable them to discharge the standard of duty that Montgomery 
would seem to require’.124  While it may be unfair to expect the same level of disclosure of a 
GP than of consultant specialist involved in intricate and high-risk surgery, it is not 
unreasonable to expect the former to disclose certain types of information to patients.  There 
was no case that focused exclusively on risk disclosure, although the earlier mentioned decision 
in Thompson v Bradford is tangentially relevant.125 In addition to the allegation of negligent 
treatment, there was also an ancillary allegation of negligent disclosure.  In the High Court, 
Wilkie J held the GP liable for failing to inform the child’s parents that a recurrent perianal 
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abscess was unique in that particular GP’s experience and extremely unusual, and that there 
was the very real prospect of the child having to undergo surgery in the near future should the 
problem not resolve after a course of antibiotics.126  The Court of Appeal later overruled this 
decision.127   
 This is exactly the type of case in which Montgomery should bite.  The fact that it may 
not have been foreseeable to the GP that there was a specific risk of contracting Polio from the 
very vaccine that sought to guard against it, and that therefore he was under no duty to disclose 
it, should have been no excuse for his failure to divulge the other more general risks that may 
have equally operated on the minds of the child’s parents when deciding whether or not to 
proceed with the immunisation.128  Had they been informed of the illness’s highly unusual 
nature, and of the potential need for future surgery with the associated risk of an open wound, 
they may have been likely to postpone the vaccination until the child was in a more stable 
condition. While not specific to the risk that eventually materialised, these were still crucial 
pieces of information that the GP omitted to inform the parents about, which would have been 
likely to influence their decision.  Arguably the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Thompson 
would not survive the ruling in Montgomery as this was significant information that would 
have affected the decision-making process of most reasonable parents, and, if not, almost 
certainly those particular parents.129  Mindful of the modern developments in primary care, 
especially in the light of minor surgical procedures now being performed in primary care 
settings, the advice to a GP has to be to keep a watchful eye on the developing post-
Montgomery case law and to remain diligent in terms of what she discloses to patients.130 
 
v) Causation: Inimical to Success? 
The findings do not lend support to the view that causation is a troublesome obstacle to patients 
in GP cases.  Where patients lost, the majority of claims actually failed because the patient was 
unable to prove breach.  The question of causation therefore became academic.  Nonetheless, 
judges would often proceed to speculate as to what would have been the situation had it been 
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a live issue and, where breach was not established, they usually indicated that causation would 
also have failed.131  What become clear was that causation was not an impediment to success 
in that it did not operate to defeat claims that had succeeded in proving breach; once a patient 
established breach, a favourable finding of causation usually followed.  In fact, where breach 
was proven, there was only one instance in which a claim subsequently failed on a point of 
causation.132 
 Where the question centred on the lack of, or late, referral, judges frequently endorsed 
medical testimony in support of the fact that earlier treatment would have avoided the harm 
that eventuated.133  Reliance by patients on the reasoning in Wright was therefore never 
required in order to succeed. The judgment was actually only raised once, and by a GP not a 
patient, in an attempt by the former to argue that the chain of causation had been broken by the 
subsequent negligence of a hospital.134  However, as the question of breach had already been 
decided in favour of the GP, Jay J did not analyse the submission to any great extent, save for 
suggesting that, irrespective of the applicability of Wright, he would have found that the GP’s 
negligence was an effective cause of the patient’s injury had he been required to rule on it.135  
 From a different perspective, where a claimant’s primary argument in respect of 
causation was disputed, HHJ Oliver-Jones QC stated in Coakley v Rosie that, even if her ‘but 
for’ argument did not succeed, he would still have found for her on her alternative argument, 
which was based on the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Bailey v Ministry of Defence.136  Here 
it was held that where cumulative causes of harm exist, and where the current state of scientific 
knowledge precludes a finding that the negligent act, as one of those causes, was in fact the 
most probable cause of the harm, if a claimant can still prove that the contribution of the 
negligence was more than negligible, then the ‘but for’ test should be modified and her case 
ought to succeed.137  Given that Bailey was a case that involved hospital treatment, its apparent 
endorsement in respect of primary care negligence is curious.  This is especially so in the light 
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of it representing a modification to the conventional ‘but for test’ that is not without critics.138  
Irrespective of that, it would seem even though some patients may encounter difficulty in 
establishing conventional ‘but for’ causation in a referral case against a GP, where scientific 
uncertainty exists, it may still be possible for them to argue that the medical condition itself, 
plus any delay in treating it based on an inadequate referral, represent cumulative causes of any 
harm.  Provided it can be said that the contribution of the negligent referral was more than 
trivial, then judges may be willing to treat such arguments with a sympathetic eye. 
 A further argument was also illumined.  It was identified that, in certain circumstances, 
an urgent referral from a GP would lead to a patient being ‘fast-tracked’ through the hospital 
admissions system.139  It was pointed out by Jay J in FB v Rana that ‘there is a material 
difference between a child arriving at A&E, even by ambulance, because parents are concerned 
that she might require urgent attention, and a child arriving there…because a trained medical 
professional, a GP, harbours concern’.140  This is effectively saying that, where a patient is 
specifically referred by a GP, she is more likely to receive swifter treatment from a hospital 
and thus enjoy a greater chance of any illness being brought under control than she would have 
experienced had she arrived at the hospital by other means.  This improves the chances of a 
patient being able to establish that a lack of referral was a key causative factor, but it is a slightly 
skewed line of reasoning.  It is perhaps plausible that a patient who presents to hospital of her 
own volition may not be taken as seriously as she would have been had she arrived on the back 
of a GP referral.  However, it is hoped that any obviously sick patient, especially a child arriving 
with concerned parents, and certainly one that arrives by ambulance, would be given swift 
attention by hospital staff regardless of a lack of referral.  The urgency with which a patient is 
treated by a hospital should not be wholly dependent upon how they arrive there and under 
whose instructions they were told to attend.  To allow a hypothetical inquiry such as this to 
influence causal calculations is potentially dangerous because how a patient may have been 
treated is a question fraught with conjecture.  Thus, in Fallon v Wilson, Eady J acknowledged 
the ‘fast track’ argument, but treated it with hesitancy given that it demanded a degree of 
speculation.141  Caution is definitely sensible, yet, notwithstanding that, it does seem that judges 
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may be receptive to this line of reasoning.  If it holds sway in the future, it is something else 
that could be advantageous to patients in the domain of causation. 
 The judgment of the then House of Lords in Gregg v Scott could, at first blush, be 
construed as being detrimental to a claimant’s prospects of recovery where there is a slower, 
yet more sinister, condition that goes undetected by a GP.142 Cancer is one such archetypal 
condition.  While Gregg v Scott effectively precludes a patient from recovering damages for 
having lost the chance of a cure, it became apparent that this ruling did not act as a complete 
bar to patients recovering at least something in missed cancer and related claims.  Despite 
judges remaining resolute in denying loss of chance arguments, they would sometimes 
manoeuvre their way around that position in order to grant a measure of damages which 
ensured that deserving claimants were not left wholly uncompensated.  Judges approved an 
aspect of Lady Hale’s judgment in Gregg v Scott, in which she endorsed an alternative to the 
pure loss of chance argument.  She suggested that, despite recovery not being possible for loss 
of chance, where the median life expectancy of a patient may have fallen due to any delay in 
treatment, there may be a ‘modest claim in respect of the “lost years”’.143  This effectively 
allows a judge to perform a calculation based on the median life expectancy of a patient whose 
complaint was identified and dealt with at the correct time.144  Where there is a negligent delay 
in treatment, a patient’s median life expectancy may be reduced by the amount of time of the 
delay. 
 Bean J in JD v Mather deduced that the patient’s prospects were worsened, not only in 
the sense of a reduced chance of survival beyond ten years, but also in the sense of a reduced 
expectation of life.145   He therefore decided that, measured against the median, the patient’s 
life expectancy was reduced by three years.146 In reaching this conclusion, a crucial factor 
seemed to be that the negligent delay resulted in a changed staging of the melanoma and good 
quality statistical information was available to show the impact of this on median life 
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expectancy.147  However, where that statistical information is not of the same quality, and 
perhaps not as convincing as to the impact of any negligent delay on median life expectancy,148 
it appears claimants’ prospects of success in relation to this line of argument may be 
diminished.149  For some, the continued failure of the courts to recognise loss of chance may 
still seem illogical and unsatisfactory.150  It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the 
merits and pitfalls of allowing such an approach,151 yet, for those who regard the current legal 
position as unduly restrictive, some comfort can be taken from the fact that there are at least 
some ways to circumvent the harsher effects of the current bar to loss of chance recovery. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides an original insight into the judicial reasoning which has underpinned 
negligence claims concerning GPs over a twenty-year period.  The research feeds into the 
broader conceptual debate about the changing nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and 
explores judicial appetites for forensically scrutinising medical decision-making.  It also 
provides useful practical guidance to help avoid complaints and legal redress.   
 The findings confirm that the majority of claims that make it as far as court centre on 
the issue of misdiagnosis and inadequate referral.  While claimants tended to lose in the 
majority of these, there was still some evidence of judges being prepared to engage with the 
medical testimony to a greater extent and, on occasion, rely on their own objective assessment 
of the question of reasonableness where very obvious poor practice was demonstrated, or where 
there was a disproportionate risk to benefit ratio. In situations where a patient was exposed to 
a potentially severe risk, which could have been avoided with a relatively straightforward 
precaution, judges showed at least some willingness to hold GPs responsible.  Judges did seem 
to recognise that the question of whether or not to refer is complex and should not be resolved 
by recourse to an over-cautious approach in every circumstance.  What is needed is a rounded 
balancing of the risk versus benefits of a particular treatment decision in order to reach a 
defensible conclusion as to its logicality and reasonableness.  In some instances this exercise 
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was conducted by judges in the way that it should have been, but in others it was not.  Certainly, 
in the future, judges ought to be more inclined to hold a GP liable in negligence for behavior 
which exposes the patient to a risk that could easily have been avoided by taking a simple 
precaution.   The study has also demonstrated that, while causation is indeed a difficult obstacle 
to overcome in some cases, it is not necessarily an impediment to success where a breach of 
duty was established.  A GP and her defenders should thus not be lulled into a false sense of 
security in thinking that, even where breach is proven, the majority of claims will still 
nonetheless be defeated on causation. 
 Communication and information exchange were also important themes in many of the 
cases.152  A GP should not approach communication in a blinkered fashion, with an over-
dependence on standard questions to elicit a speedy and accurate diagnosis. She should enter 
into a dialogue with her patient in order to determine any wider factors that may be relevant to 
the diagnosis. In order to achieve this, it is imperative that communication is approached in a 
subjective manner, with questioning being tailored to the patient as an individual.  In the rare 
cases that do make it as far as court, being able to demonstrate strong communication skills 
between not only the GP and the patient, but also between GPs themselves, may go some way 
towards reducing liability.  Similarly, taking the time to keep detailed notes will usually work 
to the advantage of a GP should any complaint become the subject of subsequent legal action.  
Faced with increasing pressures, both in terms of time and resources, any suggestion to spend 
more time conversing with patients, and on writing comprehensive notes, may not be welcomed 
by those in practice.  Nonetheless, in order to avoid potential future law suits, these 
recommendations ought not to be ignored.153  At the very least, it should be acknowledged that 
allocation of resource questions, while pertinent to the issue of referral, should not be the 
driving factor mitigating against such a decision. Concerns about a patient’s health should 
remain the paramount concern for a GP in her decision-making processes and, while the law 
of negligence should not necessarily treat the over-cautious approach as the gold-standard, she 
may well be advised to exercise vigilance if there is ever any doubt in her mind as to the need 
to refer a patient. 
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